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highlighTs
●	 The WTO membership will not be able to conclude stalled multilateral trade 
talks by the end of 2011—a blow that spells the doom of the Doha Development 
Agenda (DDA) after 10 years of inconclusive negotiations under the WTO’s 
‘Single Undertaking’. It is now time to acknowledge the political realities: the 
Doha Round is dead.
●	 This policy brief outlines the history, causes, and consequences of a failed Doha 
and lays out the core elements of a necessary ‘Plan B’.
●	 The roots of failure are to be found in domestic politics of key WTO members on 
the core mercantilist items of the Doha agenda—agriculture and manufacturing. 
While some members—notably the United States—are not able to live with a 
low-ambition deal, others—notably China, India, and Brazil—cannot commit 
to elements of a high-ambition deal.
●	 In the short term, WTO members need to ‘harvest the organs’ of the Doha Round 
to deliver benefits to least developed members and as a confidence-building 
measure to get the WTO back on track.
●	 In the long run, the death of Doha poses questions about the role of the WTO 
as guardian and rule-maker of the international trading system. New thinking is 
needed on the future role of the WTO as well as new approaches to multilateral 
trade liberalisation.
1 David Kleimann is a PhD Researcher at the Law Department of the European University Institute in 
Florence (david.kleimann@eui.eu). Joe Guinan is Director of the TransFarm Africa initiative at the Aspen 
Institute in Washington, DC (joe.guinan@aspeninstitute.org). The authors would like to thank Petros 
Mavroidis for his valuable comments. Of course, any shortcomings remain the authors’ alone.
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The Doha RounD is DeaD
Historians will probably date the final death 
knell for the Doha Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations at the World Trade Organisation 
to Friday, April 29, 2011—six months shy of the 
round’s tenth anniversary. In his remarks that 
day to the WTO’s Trade Negotiations Committee 
(TNC) which oversees the Doha talks, Director-
General Pascal Lamy told the WTO membership 
that “this Round is, once more, on the brink 
of failure,” with blockages in every important 
area. Lamy, a dedicated marathon runner and 
optimist by profession, avoided the obvious 
conclusion, promising to report back to the 
full membership on May 31. What he did not 
say, although everyone in the room knew it, is 
that the time for a successful conclusion to the 
Round has now passed. Timing is everything 
in the huge multidimensional chess game 
that is the Doha endgame, and with the failure 
to conclude the talks this year a window of 
opportunity will close. The political constraints 
associated with a U.S. presidential election 
year and the change of Chinese leadership in 
2012 add to the cold political wind that has 
been blowing on trade will delay meaningful 
negotiations in Geneva for at least another two 
years. This spells the doom of the round, which 
cannot survive such a blow at this stage, 10 
years after its inception, and retain its current 
agenda and objectives.
For both political and systemic reasons, it 
is clearly impossible for Lamy and the WTO 
membership to acknowledge failure publicly. 
This would only serve to jeopardize the 
remaining trust in and legitimacy of the WTO 
system, which is the basis of its sustainability. 
Instead, in the May 31 informal TNC meeting, 
WTO members desperately sought to veil the 
death of the round by aiming for some minor 
deliverables by December of this year. WTO 
members agreed to what Lamy euphemistically 
termed a  “three tracks” search for results:
●	 First, in the run-up to the WTO Ministerial 
Conference in December, WTO members 
pledged to give fast track priority to an ‘early 
harvest’ package deal for Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs), including items such as 
Duty-Free and Quota-Free (DFQF) market 
access, rules of origin, cotton subsidies, and a 
waiver for lifting restrictions on LDC services 
exports.
●	 Second, until December, members will seek 
to come to terms on a number of LDC-plus 
issues, which could include items such 
as trade facilitation, fisheries subsidies, 
environmental goods, export competition, 
and reformed rules for the WTO’s Dispute 
Settlement Understanding.
●	 Third, in line with the original Doha 
Development Agenda, members will 
officially stick to the ‘Single Undertaking’—
the negotiating rule in which “nothing is 
agreed until everything is agreed”. However, 
the contentious core elements of the 
agenda—including non-agricultural market 
access (NAMA), agriculture, and services—
will be put on the ‘slow track’.
The official position essentially seeks to distract 
from the fact that the core elements of the 
agenda have gone, and will go, nowhere, even 
after the American elections and Chinese 
leadership changes in 2012. A deal on these 
core mercantilist items on the basis of current 
negotiation modalities is impossible. In light 
of the unbridgeable gaps between members’ 
positions on NAMA and agriculture, negotiators 
would have to start from scratch in 2012. Putting 
these issues on the ‘slow track’ merely veils the 
complete failure to reach an agreement and the 
reality that negotiations on these core items of 
the DDA are dead. In addition, the attempt to 
secure an ‘early harvest’ by December is a sign 
of the desperate needto  demonstrate some 
kind of outcome—any kind of outcome—
to save face, avoid a nasty blame game, and 
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preserve  the remaining trust in and legitimacy 
of the WTO system. However, diverging positions 
on the ‘early harvest’ are already emerging, and 
the content and overall likelihood of a deal is all 
but certain. What is certain, however, is that the 
‘early harvest’ would, in fact, be the ‘only harvest’ 
of a decade of negotiations on the Doha Round.
FRom incepTion To FailuRe: 
Doha To geneva
Launched with high hopes in November 2001 in 
Doha, Qatar, two months after the September 
11 attacks on the United States, the Doha Round 
has seen the world change fundamentally in the 
course of its lifetime. The shifting geopolitics 
and economics of a world in transformation 
have brought with them corresponding shifts 
in the challenges facing the multilateral trading 
system—shifts which WTO members have found 
difficult to address.
Following several false starts, including the 
breakdown of the WTO Ministerial Conference 
in Seattle in 1999 amid teargas and protests, the 
impetus for Doha was closely tied to the needs 
of the international community for a means by 
which to demonstrate their commitment to 
working together in the aftermath of 9/11. In 
the belief that widespread global poverty serves 
as a breeding ground for terrorism it was agreed 
that the Doha Round should be a “development 
round” in which an agreement would harness 
trade to meet the pressing problems of 
global poverty and underdevelopment. The 
Doha agenda was highly ambitious from the 
outset, mandating negotiations on the classic 
mercantilist issues of agricultural tariffs and 
subsidies and non-agricultural market access 
as well as second-generation trade issues such 
as rules on industrial subsidies, anti-dumping, 
intellectual property rights, environmental 
goods, fisheries subsidies, trade facilitation, and 
trade in services. 
This ambitious agenda quickly ran into 
difficulties as the emergence of new economic 
powers began to manifest itself in the changing 
dynamics of multilateral trade negotiations. 
The formation of the G-202 group of larger 
developing country WTO members, including 
Brazil, India, China, Argentina, South Africa, 
Indonesia, Mexico, and Thailand, at the WTO 
Ministerial in Cancún in 2003 marked the final 
end of the traditional dominance of the ‘Quad’ 
of the United States, European Union, Japan, 
and Canada in prior negotiating rounds under 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), predecessor to the WTO. As the WTO 
membership assembled in Cancún, negotiators 
experienced their first full-blown stand-off, with 
the G-20 on one side and the European Union 
and United States on the other.
The large agricultural exporters of the G-20 
pressed their demands for deep cuts in 
agricultural tariffs and subsidies by OECD 
countries to finally deliver on what they saw 
as a long-deferred promise, dating back to the 
Tokyo Round (1973-1979), to rectify market 
distortions in world agriculture. The European 
Union, on the other hand, pushed to expand 
the negotiations to the so-called ‘Singapore 
Issues’—investment, competition, government 
procurement, and trade facilitation. Both 
the EU and the U.S. called for reductions in 
developing countries’ industrial tariffs in return 
for concessions on agriculture. U.S. negotiators, 
in seeking to promote their agricultural export 
interests, locked themselves into the position of 
demanding gains within each negotiating area, 
including agriculture, and not simply gains 
across the whole Doha package. At the same 
time, West African countries turned up the heat 
on the U.S. cotton subsidy program. 
2  Not the same grouping as the better-known Group of 
Twenty (G-20) Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors 
established in 1999.
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Round, 4 February 2011
Overall, the Cancún Ministerial took place in an 
ideologically-charged atmosphere fuelled by 
the presence of thousands of NGO and media 
representatives. It ended in acrimony and 
widespread name-calling but without substantive 
results. Looking back, it is possible to make a 
strong case that Cancún marked the point at 
which the Doha Round first went into terminal 
decline. Certainly, the guiding spirit of international 
collaboration in the face of global challenges began 
to dwindle around that time. However, in the years to 
come negotiators did make some modest progress. 
The 2004 “July Framework Agreement” laid out in 
broad terms a pathway to reaching modalities and 
reduction formulas for Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) 
tariffs and agricultural subsidies, and addressed the 
controversial Singapore Issues by incorporating 
trade facilitation into the negotiating agenda. 
Agriculture remained at the heart of the round. 
To some degree, the EU had done its homework 
in advance by instituting reforms to the Common 
Agricultural Policy in 2003. However, the WTO 
Ministerial in Hong Kong in December 2005 was an 
inflexion point for the level of ambition in the round. 
EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson held 
to 2013 as the phase-out date for EU agricultural 
export subsidies, and the only real achievements in 
Hong Kong were commitments on Aid for Trade and 
on granting LDCs Duty-Free and Quota-Free market 
access. But even here the devil had to be extracted 
from the technical details. Economic modelling 
analysis revealed that a multitude of sins could be 
concealed within the granting of 97% rather than 
100% DFQF, which was what was on the table.
After Hong Kong the EU withdrew more and more 
from the fray. European negotiators felt they 
had offered significant reductions in agricultural 
protection, made relatively modest demands of 
developing countries on industrial tariffs, and 
conceded most of their agenda on the Singapore 
Issues for the sake of concluding the round. But the 
disappointing outcome of Hong Kong marked the 
beginning of the end. From that point the level of 
ambition in the Doha negotiations trended steadily 
downwards. Although the EU could live with this, 
and was henceforth able to present itself as a 
relatively unproblematic partner, living with low 
ambition was exactly what the United States could 
not do. 
Strong external pressure on the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) to reduce subsidy support to 
the U.S. farm sector was at least offset by mounting 
domestic pressure from the U.S. farm lobby 
not to make any concessions without securing 
substantially improved access to the markets of the 
big emerging economies in agriculture. Meanwhile, 
the rise of China and the lack of a significant social 
safety net for dislocated American workers fed a 
growing popular anti-trade sentiment in Congress 
which fixated on high annual external U.S. trade 
deficits and Chinese “currency manipulation” as well 
as job and investment flight through “offshoring.” In 
this context, only an ambitious agreement could 
motivate the U.S. export interests that are essential 
to the passage of any trade agreement and mobilize 
them for the necessary campaign of arm-twisting 
and vote-counting in Congress.
However, for structural reasons the emerging 
giants themselves did not have much to put on the 
table. With some justification, China pointed to the 
extensive package of tariff reductions and domestic 
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economic reforms that had been made a condition 
for Chinese WTO accession in 2001 and claimed to 
have already done its part. Moreover, India and Brazil 
had made unilateral reductions in applied tariffs 
on industrial goods to such a large extent over the 
previous ten years that the formula cuts foreseen 
in the Doha modalities would not actually bite, 
reducing legal baseline rates but leaving applied 
duties unaffected. For them, the elephant—or 
rather, the dragon—in the living room was China. 
Brazil, India, and other emerging economies were 
reluctant to further reduce industrial tariffs on an 
MFN basis because market opening towards OECD 
countries on this basis would also result in market 
opening towards China, whom they increasingly 
feared as a competitor. 
To further complicate matters, there were differing 
strategies reflecting diverging national interests 
among the G-20. At one extreme, India was 
fiercely protective of its 800-million-strong army 
of subsistence farmers, whom it wished to shelter 
from import competition from the United States 
and elsewhere. At the other pole, Brazil, as one 
of the world’s largest agricultural exporters, was 
pushing hard to get the U.S. to dismantle its walls of 
agricultural protection and domestic subsidisation. 
In summary, the United States Trade Representative 
was increasingly in need of an ambitious and 
commercially attractive outcome given U.S. 
domestic politics. But China, India and Brazil all have 
domestic politics too, and were not in a position to 
supply such a result—especially in the face of U.S. 
offers on agriculture and manufacturing that were 
not perceived to be worth additional concessions.
In these circumstances, the July 2008 Ministerial in 
Geneva was destined to fail, and fail it did. Despite 
some convergence on side issues, the political 
impasse on the core items remained. The proximate 
cause of the collapse lay in the arcane details of the 
so-called Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM)—a 
device that would allow developing countries to 
increase tariffs to protect their farmers from import 
surges and price declines. A stand-off developed 
between, on the one hand, India and China, and, on 
the other, the United States. Ironically, the issue was 
to lose much of its importance almost immediately 
as sharply increasing global food prices did away 
with anxieties over floods of cheap farm imports. 
On the manufacturing front, the U.S. had been 
pressing emerging economies—China in 
particular—to sign up to a number of so-called 
“sectoral” initiatives which would eliminate or 
significantly reduce tariffs in certain industrial 
sectors such as industrial machinery, chemicals, or 
electronics in addition to across-the-board MFN 
formula cuts. This was seen as a way to compensate 
for otherwise minimal market access gains. China 
eventually made clear that this was not going to 
happen, taking away from then-USTR Susan Schwab 
the sweetener she needed to appease skeptics in 
the U.S. business community. Failure to bridge the 
sharply diverging positions led Lamy to end the 
Ministerial with an admission of defeat.
“No deal is better than a bad deal,” according to the 
U.S. trade lobby, and this dynamic persists today. 
Until it changes, it will be very difficult for any 
U.S. Administration—particularly the current one, 
lacking ‘fast track’ trade negotiating authority and 
needing to appease anti-trade constituencies in the 
Democratic Party—to sign up to a deal. Without U.S. 
support it will be impossible to conclude the round.
The round has been largely moribund since 
July 2008. The world financial meltdown and 
subsequent global economic contraction led to 
surging unemployment in the United States and 
elsewhere, and resulting protectionist pressures 
around the world further undermined chances for a 
deal. While world leaders repeatedly pledged their 
commitment to the completion of the round by the 
end of 2010 (and then, later, by the end of 2011), 
their more urgent concern was to get the economy 
moving again while preventing the outbreak of a 
1930s-style global trade war. 
Each attempt since to reinvigorate the round has 
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failed. Over Easter 2011, the WTO membership 
came to the end of the line when the U.S. and China 
once again failed to agree on sectorals, with Lamy 
recognizing that it is NAMA “where the magnitude 
of the gaps among major players is effectively 
blocking progress in other areas.”
The causes anD consequences oF FailuRe
There has been no shortage of  plausible 
explanations for the slow death of the Doha 
Round. Among the most prominent are those 
that emphasize that the negotiations were ill-
prepared from the outset or that the negotiating 
agenda was overloaded. More recently observers 
point to protectionist pressures stemming from 
the economic crisis or, alternatively, the declining 
importance of concessions on agriculture vis-à-vis 
manufacturing in a world in which food prices are 
skyrocketing and tariffs being lowered unilaterally, 
rendering concerns about the price suppression 
effects of subsidies somewhat outmoded. Each of 
these explanations is true to some degree. However, 
the fundamental cause of the Doha Round’s failure 
can be found in the quintessentially mercantilist 
trade politics which—after a flush of idealism in the 
wake of 9/11—returned to the fore in Cancún and 
has persisted since.  
It has long been clear that Doha cannot meet the 
high expectations raised for the negotiations. Early 
estimates of $500 billion in annual global welfare 
gains using computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
models of the global economy have been gradually 
reduced to estimates in the region of $100 billion, 
depending on whether a modest liberalisation of 
services is included. Poverty alleviation impacts 
would be modest or even negative for some WTO 
members.
Is there any political imperative for such a deal? Not 
that anyone can see. Simon Evenett has summed 
it up well: “I see no basis for a deal… There are a 
small number of countries (notably the U.S.) who 
can’t do a low-ambition deal and a large number 
of countries that can’t do a high-ambition deal. 
Domestic developments in the main trading parties 
account for this outcome—until they change, the 
impasse continues.”
So what has been lost? To some degree, the errors of 
overestimating the gains from Doha may have given 
way to an underestimation. Modeling analysis has 
some serious limitations and cannot capture many 
dynamic effects. Trade in services—the fastest-
growing and potentially largest tradable sector—
is either not included in the models for technical 
reasons or included in a very crude fashion. Aid 
for Trade and trade facilitation are also outside of 
the models. The benefits stemming from a trade 
facilitation agreement—already within reach at the 
WTO but currently held hostage under the Single 
Undertaking—could dwarf those resulting from 
the rest of a Doha deal. The World Bank estimates 
that bringing countries whose trade facilitation 
capacity is below average even halfway up to the 
average could increase overall trade by almost $400 
billion annually.
Another element to appreciate when thinking 
about a failed Doha is the importance of the 
multilateral trading system itself to developing 
countries. Even absent a massive upswing in 
protectionism following a failed round, the WTO 
system risks erosion and a loss of credibility. Lacking 
the reinforcement of progressive agreements, 
there are clear limitations to what even a fully-
functioning WTO dispute settlement mechanism 
can achieve on the basis of current rules. Current 
protectionist pressures around the globe, resulting 
from prevailing high unemployment rates in many 
larger economies in the wake of the economic crisis, 
are likely to provide further challenges to the WTO 
as the guardian of international trade.
This represents a serious problem for developing 
country members, particularly the small and 
vulnerable. Alternatives to multilateralism such at 
bilateral  Free  Trade  Agreements (FTAs)  are skewed 
in favor of the powerful, whereas the WTO’s Most
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Josep Borrell, President of the EUI, Prof. Miguel Maduro, Director of the Global Governance Programme, Prof. Petros C. 
Mavroidis, Columbia University, with the top-level policy makers and leading academic participants.
Favoured Nation (MFN) principle allows even the smallest WTO members with tiny markets and 
nothing much to offer to benefit from the full extent of market opening that occurs under WTO 
rules and to operate on the basis of the same terms of trade. The WTO is the only venue in which 
developing countries can truly hope to get a “fair shake” over the longer term.
On the other hand, the flight into regionalism hardly provides a complete alternative to the 
multilateral system. Certainly, FTA-induced trade diversion is not a good thing, but as long as trade 
between the giants of the system remains subject to MFN tariffs for the foreseeable future, the 
incentives for participation in the rules-based system in the short term, and for further multilateral 
agreements in the longer run, will remain. No OECD member will be willing to give up on improved 
access to the Chinese market for long. Moreover, ‘WTO-plus’ and ‘WTO-extra’ third-generation 
regulatory integration outside the realm of the WTO could actually facilitate the ‘multilateralisation’ 
of the progress made in these areas and reinforce rather than undermine the system as a whole. 
Regional agreements may spur the development of third-generation trade rules where regional 
solutions are most effective and efficient. WTO-centrism, after all, is not a value in itself. And for 
the larger economies, in the context of internationally interlinked production and value chains, 
there are still strong incentives to converge around the set of rules provided under WTO auspices. 
Russia’s long-awaited WTO accession may provide a further example of the value of predictable and 
continuous rules-based commercial relations.
haRvesT The oRgans!
Unless a rabbit magically appears out of a hat, there are few credible options short of recognizing 
the death of the Doha Round. The course now being ●charted in Geneva is to separate negotiating 
areas into three tracks, with fast, medium and slow tracks according to the degree of difficulty and 
likelihood of agreement. But current pronouncements indicate an effort to preserve the façade that 
this can be accomplished within a Doha framework, that new wine can be put into old bottles. A 
frank recognition of the death of the round may make it easier for negotiators in Geneva to “harvest 
the organs”—the more uncontroversial elements of the round such as trade facilitation, Duty-Free 
Quota-Free access to large economies for the poorest countries, and so forth—which could serve as 
confidence-building measures for preserving WTO credibility and legitimacy in the short run.
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Trade facilitation has most often been mentio-
ned as a candidate for a separate deal as it is 
uncontroversial and holds out the prospect of 
‘win-wins.’ Picking additional items will be tri-
ckier, as early discussions of Lamy’s proposed 
“three tracks” indicate.  To be sure, a package 
for LDCs providing for DFQF market access wi-
thout exceptions is imperative. An initiative to 
significantly lower services market restrictions 
for LDCs would be a great supplement to free 
access for LDC services. Such a package should 
also cover cotton subsidies and the elimina-
tion of agricultural export subsidies in general, 
which ought long ago to have been consigned 
to the dustbin of history. Areas where agre-
ement would contribute to the provision of 
important global public goods include nego-
tiations on environmental goods and restric-
tions on fisheries subsidies. Nevertheless, many 
of the items in this ‘new’ agenda touch upon 
areas of domestic sensitivity for several WTO 
members. Only time will tell whether they are 
willing and able to agree on the ‘early harvest’ 
that would, in truth, be the only harvest of the 
round.
It is now the time, as former Mexican President 
Ernesto Zedillo was insisting back in 2007 in 
Forbes magazine, to “save the WTO from the 
Doha Round.” Ultimately, the failure of Doha 
underscores the necessity of rethinking the 
purpose and functioning of the WTO as an 
institution. The WTO will not, in the long run, 
retain its centrality through well-functioning 
administration and adjudication of trade di-
sputes alone. Shallower and faster agreements 
rather than the great omnibus trade rounds of 
the past could be one way to facilitate progress 
so that the WTO membership can keep pace 
with rapid changes in the global economy. The 
Single Undertaking itself, which has become a 
straightjacket, may have to be relaxed, opening 
the door to plurilateral agreements among wil-
ling partners. 
Without doubt, such a ‘Harvesting of the Or-
gans,’ ‘Plan B,’ ‘Doha-Lite,’ or ‘Safe Landing’ has 
plenty of drawbacks compared to the best-ca-
se scenario - notably a deal that would repre-
sent a victory for multilateralism and provide a 
much-needed shot in the arm for today’s falte-
ring global economy struggling with financial 
market volatility, the effects of high commodity 
and energy prices, and a mounting food crisis. 
But now is the moment to acknowledge politi-
cal realities and find innovative and pragmatic 
second-best solutions that will better serve us 
all in a post-Doha world.
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